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I. INTRODUCTION
Just fourteen months ago, the Sago Mine disaster' gripped the nation
and the world. The fate of thirteen miners lost deep in a West Virginia coal
mine hung in the balance as rescue efforts dragged on for two days and nights.
The hopes and prayers of the miners' families and countless millions in a vast
television audience seemed finally to be answered as the words "they're alive!"
resounded through the mine site and around the world.2 But the joy of a miracle
Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. Thanks to Pat McGinley,
Ellen Dannin, Michael Gooen, Jeff Hirsch, Brienne Greiner, Luke Boso, and Kate Hartung for
their comments on these remarks, which were given on March 21, 2007, as part of the West Vir-
ginia Law Review's Symposium: Thinking Outside of the Box: A Post-Sago Look at Coal Mine
Safety. Thanks also to Brienne Griener, Mary Claire Johnson, Latoya Porterfield, Thomas Mat-
thew Lockhart, Gabriele Wohl and the editors of the West Virginia Law Review, volumes 109,
110, and 111, for their exceptional work on this symposium issue. Special thanks to John Fisher,
Joyce McConnell, and Pat McGinley for their creative input on these remarks and the symposium.
I The Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) defines mining
disasters as "mine accidents claiming five or more lives." MSHA, HISTORICAL DATA
ON MINE DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/MSHAFCT8.HTM (last visited June 4, 2007).
2 Brian Todd, Family Members Say 12 Miners Found Alive, CNN, Jan. 4, 2006,
http://www.cnn.conV2006fUS/01/03/mine.explosion/index.htm; Ann Scott Tyson, Twelve Found
Alive in W. Va. Coal Mine, WASH POST, Jan. 4, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/03/AR2006010300304.html.
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was cruelly doused by the terrible news that, in fact, there was only one survivor
clinging to life and that twelve miners had perished.3
The symposium of the West Virginia Law Review seeks to honor the
Sago miners and all those who daily risk their lives. West Virginia coal miners
and their peers throughout the American coalfields, as well as coal mines
throughout the world, work in anonymity to provide the power that fuels the
American and global economy and provides electricity that allows all of us to
live in unparalleled comfort. The goal of this symposium is to explore and
stimulate new ways of examining and solving a very old problem-the chal-
lenge of providing the safest possible workplace for America's coal miners.
It is in this vein that I talk to you today about the legal and policy issues
arising from the Sago disaster. The Law Review editors have concluded that
tackling the complex issues associated with coal mining safety requires the crea-
tive thinking involved in both comparative and interdisciplinary analysis. The
value of this approach is apparent upon examination of the questions that have
arisen in the wake of the Sago disaster. This approach appears all the more
relevant today-just two days after another methane explosion claimed the lives
of over 100 persons in a Russian coal mine thousands of miles from West Vir-
ginia.
II. COAL MINE SAFETY CONCERNS
A. Overview of U.S. Coal Mine Industry's Safety Issues
It is axiomatic to observe that coal mining is a dangerous occupation.
Putting aside the long-term health problems associated with mining, such as
black lung disease,5 coal operators, regulators, and miners face many potential
hazards, most notably fires, floods, explosions, roof falls, and electrocution, as
well as powered haulage and machinery accidents.6
3 Tamara Jones & Ann Scott Tyson, After 44 Hours, Hope Showed its Cruel Side, WASH.
POST, Jan. 5, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/04/AR2006010400247.htnl; Dennis B. Roddy & Steven Twedt, Sago
Mine Rescuers Sorry for Heartache, POST-GAZETTE, May 4, 2006, http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/06124/687382-85.stm.
4 More Than 100 Dead in Siberian Mine Disaster, RADIO FREE EUROPE, Mar. 20, 2007,
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/d23ddcaO-e230-4974-8b85-3b6ff2O54b4f.htm: Sibe-
rian Mine Blast Kills Most in 10 Years, USA TODAY, Mar. 19, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.comlnews/world/2007-03-19-russia-mineN.htm.
5 The United Mine Workers has estimated that 1500 former coal miners die of black lung
disease each year. See Democracy Now!, Whistleblower Warns the Bush Administration is Cut-
ting Back Mining Safety Regulations,
http://www.democracynow.org/2006/1/5/whistleblower-warns-the-bushadministration-is (last
visited Sept. 19, 2008).
6 In 2006, of the forty-seven coal-mining-related deaths, thirty-seven occurred underground.
Of those underground fatalities, eighteen resulted from underground explosion, ten from falling
debris inside the mine, five from accidents involving underground powered haulage, and two from
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The coal mining industry's yearly fatality rate-at 2.3 per 10,000 work-
ers-makes it five times more hazardous than the average private workplace.
Let me put that number in perspective. Twenty-six thousand students attend
West Virginia University. That's as if six students were to die each year in
some university-related accident, compared with a bit more than one death per
year at other similarly sized universities.
Miners put themselves in harm's way every time they walk into a
mine-and for what purpose? Mostly so that you and I can benefit from the
comforts of modem society-about ninety-two percent of the coal produced in
the United States is used to generate electricity. And, fifty percent of the elec-
tricity generated in the United States is fueled by coal.9 The rest of the coal not
used for energy is used either for international export or for making other prod-
ucts such as synthetic materials, paper, steel, cement, and medicine.1l
B. Case Study: Sago
A brief synopsis of the Sago disaster drives home this point. At ap-
proximately 6:26 on the Monday morning of January 2, 2006, a methane explo-
sion ripped through the Sago mine projecting outward from a sealed area into
the active workings of the mine.ll At the time of the explosion, twenty-nine
miners were underground. Sixteen miners, who were located a fair distance
from the ignition point and not seriously injured by the blast, escaped.1 2 The
other thirteen miners were near the blast and were not so fortunate. One miner
underground fire. Twenty miners died in West Virginia coal mines and fifteen miners died in
Kentucky coal mines. The remaining accidents generally involved surface mining accidents. See
MSHA, 2006 FATALGRAMS AND FATAL INVESTIGATION REPORTS: COAL MINES,
http://www.msha.govlFATALS/FABC2006.asp (last visited June 4, 2007).
7 Testimony of David G. Hawkins, Director, Climate Center, Natural Resources Defense
Council: Full Committee Hearing on Coal Liquefaction and Gasification Before the Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Cong. at 6 nn. 6-7 (2006), available at
http://docs.nrdc.org/globalwarming/glo_06042401a.pdf (citing Congressional Research Service,
U.S. Coal: A Primer on the Major Issues, at 30 (March 25, 2003).
8 See statistics put out by the Energy Information Administration on the Energy Kid's Page,
http://www.eia.doe.govlkids/energyfacts/sources/non-renewable/coal.html (last visited June 4,
2007); see also Coal's Past, Present, and Future,
http://www.teachcoal.org/aboutcoal/articles/coalppf.htmi (last visited June 4, 2007) (stating that
nine out of ten tons of coal produced in the United States is used to generate electricity).
9 See The Future of Coal: Options for a Carbon-Constrained World (An Interdisciplinary
MIT Study), (2007), http://web.mit.edulcoalfTheFuture_oLCoal.pdf (last visited June 4, 2007).
In West Virginia, "99% of the generated electricity comes from coal." WVOMHST, West Virginia
Coal Mining Facts, http://www.wvminesafety.org/wvcoalfacts.htm (last visited June 4, 2007).
10 See Energy Kid's Page, supra note 8.
11 J. DAvTr MCATEER, THE SAGO MINE DISASTER: A PRELIMINARY REPORT TO GOVERNOR JOE
MANCHIN 35-39 (July 2006), available at
http://www.wju.edu/sago/SagoMineDisasterReportJuly2006.pdf.
12 Id. at 35.
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was killed by the force of the explosion itself; the other twelve attempted to
escape.'3 Consistent with their training, the twelve miners tried at first to acti-
vate their breathing apparatus, a self-contained self-rescuer, but four of those
SCSRs reportedly failed or the miners otherwise were unable to operate them.
14
The miners "had to abort that escape attempt when they encountered thick dust
and swirling smoke." 5 So, still following approved safety training, the miners
"turned back and retreated behind a curtain ... at the working face of the sec-
tion in an attempt to barricade themselves against the smoke and carbon monox-
ide created by the explosion."' 6 There those twelve miners waited, unaware that
rescue efforts were moving much more slowly than they might have expected.
Lack of communication between the rescuers and the twelve survivors
of the initial blast proved critical. For example, had technology been available
that would have allowed communication between rescuers and miners, rescuers
may have pinpointed the miners' location allowing a borehole to be drilled near
them which could have provided a fresh air source and/or an escape route. At a
minimum, rescuers could have told the miners that there was breathable air in a
nearby, still-accessible area. 17 Proper communication would have allowed res-
cuers to determine there was in fact no fire in the mine, which would have al-
lowed rescue teams to enter the mine earlier. Instead, twelve miners surrounded
by toxic methane laden air waited to be rescued; eleven of them eventually died
of asphyxiation awaiting rescue.
The Sago disaster reminds us that the price we pay for our comfort can
include serious injury and even death of those whose labors unlock the energy
of coal. 18 As one newspaper report recently observed, "[m]ine disasters like
Sago get headlines. But far more coal miners die.., alone, crushed by heavy




14 Each miner was equipped with the SR-100, an MSHA-approved SCSR, which contains a
minimum of one hour of breathable air while breathing under exertion and closer to four hours of
breathable air at rest. The SR-100 is the most widely used SCSR in U.S. mines. Id. at 50.
15 Id. at 49.
16 Id. at 35.
17 Id. at 11-12.
18 We need to be reminded of this in part because our legal actors have been complicit in blur-
ring the connection between subjecting workers to dangerous working conditions and employer
liability based on intentional rather than accidental conduct. See, e.g., Millison v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1985) (using workers compensation exclusivity doctrine to
bar workers from bringing lawsuit claiming harm caused by exposure to asbestos because em-
ployer had no intent to cause injury but allowing claim for harm caused by employer's covering
up workers' illness because of exposure to asbestos because, in that case, employer intended to
cause injury). I am grateful to Ellen Dannin for pointing this out to me.
19 Ken Ward, Jr., Disasters Get Headlines, but Miners Killed on the Job Die Alone,
CHARLESTON GAzETrE, Nov. 5, 2006, http://wvgazette.com/News/Beyond+Sago/200611050006.
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C. Questions Raised in Sago's Aftermath
In light of the Sago disaster, it seems relevant to ask: What, if any, ob-
ligations do we owe these workers who endanger themselves for our collective
comfort? Members of the legal community may ask the question another way:
What role, if any, should the law play to protect coal miner safety? These are
fundamentally the types of questions that labor and employment lawyers and
policy makers routinely ask.
It is natural to look to labor lawyers for answers to those questions. But
in these ongoing symposium proceedings, the Law Review also seeks to exam-
ine the assumption of some that coal mining in the United States is as safe as it
can be. Year 2006, with forty-seven coal miner deaths, was the deadliest year
for American coal miners since 1995 .20 That's more than double the twenty-two
coal miner deaths that occurred in 2005.21 Twenty-four of those miners came
from West Virginia-the most in any year for a quarter-century.22
Considering last year's spike in coal miner deaths, especially in West
Virginia, it was natural to wonder whether other major coal-producing states,
such as Kentucky 23 and Pennsylvania,
24 and other coal-producing countries
25
such as China,26 India,27 Australia,28 South Africa,29 Russia30 and Britain31 were
20 See MSHA, 2006 FATALGRAMS AND FATAL INVESTIGATION REPORTS: COAL MINES, supra
note 6.
21 Thomas Frank, Coal Mine Deaths Spike Upward, USA TODAY, Jan. 1, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007 -01-0 1-mine_x.htm?POE=click-refer. See also
MSHA, 2006 FATALGRAMS AND FATAL INVESTIGATION REPORTS: COAL MINES, supra note 6.




23 From 2005 to 2006, Kentucky's coal mining fatality rate doubled to sixteen deaths. See
MSHA, COAL FATALrrIES BY STATE, http://www.msha.gov/stats/charts/coalbystate.asp (last visited
June 4, 2007).
24 Pennsylvania experienced fewer deaths. See MSHA, id.
25 The top ten coal-producing countries are as follows: China (2226 Mt), U.S. (951 Mt), India
(398 Mt), Australia (301 Mt), South Africa (240 Mt), Russia (222 Mt), Indonesia (140 Mt), Po-
land (98 Mt), Kazakhstan (79 Mt), and Colombia (61 Mt). See WORLD COAL INSTITUTE: COAL
FACTS 2006 ed., http://www.worldcoal.org/assets-cm/files/PDF/coalfactcard_2006.pdf (last
visited June 4, 2007). Three-fourths of the world's coal reserves are found in Australia, China,
India, South Africa, and the United States. See ENVIRONMENTAL LITERACY COUNCIL: COAL
MINING, http://www.enviroliteracy.org/article.phpl122.html (last visited June 4, 2007); see also
ASIA-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ON CLEAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE, COAL MINING TASK FORCE,
ACTION PLAN at 3 (2006), available at
http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/APP%20Action%20Pans/Coal%2OMining%2Task%2OFo
rce%20Action%20Plan%20_27%200ct%2006_.pdf (last visited June 4, 2007).
26 Chinese coal mining appears to be the most dangerous in the world. With a production rate
of only double that of the United States (see Coal Production,
http://www.worldcoal.org/pages/content/index.asp?PagelD=188 (last visited June 4, 2007)), the
death rate is over a hundred-fold. Between 2000 and 2005, no fewer than 5,670 coal miners died
2008]
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also experiencing a rise in the level of workplace fatalities. And so, it is natural
to ask: Is the 2006 death-spike a statistical anomaly or can it be attributed to
some cause, such as lax enforcement of safety regulations, inadequate safety
equipment and/or preventive measures, or some other regulatory deficiency?
Does the 2006 death-spike simply reflect a rise in coal mining production, such
in Chinese mines in any one year, with a high of 6,995 deaths in 2002. See Deconstructing
Deadly Details from China's Coal Mine Safety Statistics, Jan. 6, 2006,
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press861.htm (last visited June 4, 2007). In 2006,
China witnessed a significant drop in coal mining fatalities to 4,746. See Reuters AlertNet, China
Sees Coal Mine Deaths Fall, But Outlook Grim, Jan. 11, 2007,
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/PEK206148.htm (last visited June 4 2007).
27 India, like the United States, has experienced a general downward trend in mining accidents,
which it attributes to a shift away from underground mining to mechanized open cast mining and a
reduction in underground manpower through mechanization. Drs. R.M. Bhattacharjee and A.K.
Sinha, Safety in Coal Mines, at slide 8,
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/intemational/Publications/cwg-april06-safety-dgms.pdf (last vis-
ited June 4, 2007).
28 "According to the Australian Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU),
coal mining is the most dangerous occupation in Australia, with coal miners having a one in
twenty-eight chance of being killed over a forty-year career." Assia Benmedjdoub & Robert
Kotevski, The Gretley Legacy,
http://oj.hss.uts.edu.au/oj l/oj l-s2004/HunterValleyMining/index.htm#Deathsandinjuries (last
visited June 4, 2007). Despite a relatively low national fatality rate, Australia recently experi-
enced its own death-spike. "From 2002-2003, the National Occupational Health and Safety
Commission recorded twelve fatalities in the mining industry. This is five more than in 2001-
2002." Id. A four-year study, July 1999-June 2003, conducted by NSW Risk Management Re-
search Centre showed the underground coal sector is incurring the highest number of reported
incidents of death or injury and that contact with electricity was increasingly becoming the most
common form of injury. Id.
Australian underground mining has decreased while surface mining has increased over the
past decade. See The Australian Coal Industry: Selected Summary Statistics,
http://www.australiancoal.com.au/industrystats.htm#employment (last visited June 4, 2007).
Recently, the Australian and Chinese governments signed a memorandum of understanding to
"exchange... information on regulation, technology, and equipment for coal mine safety." MIN-
ERALS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, MEDIA STATEMENT, Apr. 3, 2006,
http://www.minerals.org.au/ data/assets/pdf file/0019/11476/MRO0606 MCACoalSafety.pdf.
29 South Africa's coal mining death rate is more than three times that of the United States but
1/3 0
t
h that of China. Zhao Xiaohui & Jiang Xueli (Xinhua), Coal Mining: Most Deadly Job in
China, Nov. 13, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-
11/13/content_391242.htm.
30 Participants at an EU-Russia technology roundtable that took place in Moscow in June 2005
recognized the obvious dangers of coal mining and linked coal mine safety with the industry's
profitability. See EU-Russia Energy Dialogue Technology Center, Minutes of the Roundtable,
http://www.technologycentre.org/calendar-show.php?calendar=35 (last visited June 4, 2007).
31 Britain appears to be one of the safest mining countries, experiencing less than one death per
year in the entire industry. See Table 2: Coal Mine Injury Rates Per 100,000 Work Shifts,
http://www.hse.gov.uk/mining/accident/coalisd2.htm (last visited June 4, 2007). Britain also is
not, however, a top ten world coal producer. See World Coal Institute, supra note 25.
(Vol. I111
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss1/5
APPROACHING COAL MINE SAFETY
that the number of absolute deaths does not actually reflect a relatively more
dangerous workplace? 32 Or is there some other explanation?
This analysis is complicated by a fundamental distinction between work
environments. Mining in the Appalachian Coal Region, which includes West
Virginia, Kentucky and Pennsylvania, is conducted in large underground mines
while coal mining in the Great Plains and Inter-Mountain West occurs mainly in
mid-sized to large surface mines.33 This difference in the type of mining done
in the Appalachian Coal Region affects the cause of death and possibly fatality
rates. Underground mining accidents tend to be caused by explosion, which
may cause miners to become trapped, and the death toll in any given event is
increased as well as the potential for sensationalization. By contrast, surface
mining accidents often involve machinery or truck accidents, blasting injuries
and falls. In any event, an accurate statistical analysis of fatality rates must ac-
count for the differences in these types of mining in order to (1) document with
precision the types of hazards associated with each and (2) develop strategies
for addressing those hazards.34
Even if the 2006 death-spike turns out to be a statistical anomaly, the
Sago disaster drives home the dangers inherent in coal mining, especially un-
derground coal mining. From a cost-benefit perspective, it is important to in-
quire whether the industry and government regulators support economically
reasonable steps to keep miners safe. From a human rights perspective, on the
other hand, one must bear in mind that twenty-two deaths per year are twenty-
two too many deaths-and it is essential to ask whether those institutions are
doing all they should to keep miners safe. That inquiry leads to a host of other
questions that we can divide into three categories: regulation, enforcement, and
technology.
With respect to regulation and enforcement, we must identify the extent
of any relationship between mine safety regulations and trends in mine safety.
One might ask whether and how downward trends in mining injury and fatality
rates correlate with increased regulation and, more importantly, increased en-
forcement of safety regulations. Do upward trends correlate with lax enforce-
ment of existing regulations, deregulation, or even failure of the government to
provide sufficient funding for inspection and regulatory enforcement? No mat-
32 According to the National Mining Association, the United States has witnessed an eighty-
seven percent increase in coal production since 1970 and an eighty-seven percent decrease in
fatalities during the same time-period. See U.S. Coal Mine Safety and Production Trends,
http://www.nma.org/pdf/sago/s-coalsafety-production-trends011806.pdf (last visited June 4,
2007).
33 See Energy Kid's Page, supra note 8.
34 A comparative analysis of underground mining hazards alone may reveal significant differ-
ences. For example, the greatest number of underground mining fatalities in India are caused not
by explosion but by inundation, a problem that underground mines in the United States are not
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ter what answers ultimately are identified, it is important that the questions be
asked and possible answers be objectively analyzed.
The 2006 death-spike also raises questions regarding the sufficiency of
the technology available to coal miners. For example, are the technologies that
are currently available-the one-hour SCSR units, the accompanying instruction
guides, and explosion-proof seals-sufficient to make underground mining
safer? Is the best available technology being used in mines or are regulators and
operators settling for cheaper alternatives? Are there technologies not currently
available but possible in the near future that would make underground mining
safer? If the technology is available, is there a distribution problem? To what
extent can post-Sago legislative initiatives and voluntary coal industry efforts
contribute to safer coal mines?
Given the complexity of questions raised in Sago's aftermath, both a
comparative and an interdisciplinary approach seem like the natural path to tra-
vail. Let me begin with the comparative approach.
III. APPROACHES TO COAL MINE SAFETY
A. The Comparative Law Approach
Comparative law is the academic examination of various legal systems
to determine how those systems differ and compare with one another for the
purpose of better understanding our own legal system. 35 Initially, comparative
law study allows us to question our own biases by revealing them. What better
way to see our implicit assumptions about how the law should look than by
studying different solutions to the same legal issue set in different jurisdictions?
Such analysis allows us to obtain a deeper and more sophisticated understanding
of our own legal system.36
By opening our eyes to other ways of regulating behavior, comparative
law allows us to find solutions to our own legal problems that may elude us be-
cause of our own biases. All academics become entrenched in a certain way of
thinking typically inherited from their academic training. And so, when a New-
35 For an excellent discussion of what is comparative law, see Oxford University Comparative
Law Forum, http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/editorial.shtml (last visited June 4, 2007).
36 For example, Labor Law Professor Ellen Dannin has written several scholarly articles dis-
cussing New Zealand labor law, in part to examine labor law problems through the antipodean
lens-a lens that allows the American eye to see more clearly and objectively the problems asso-
ciated with different approaches. See, e.g., Ellen J. Dannin, Consummating Market-Based Labor
Law Reform in New Zealand: Context and Reconfiguration, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 267 (1996); Bar-
gaining Under New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act: The Problem of Coercion, 17 CoMP.
LAB. L. J. 455 (1996); Solidarity Forever? Unions and Bargaining Representation Under New
Zealand's Employment Contracts Act, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1995); We Can't Over-
come? A Case Study of Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform, 16 BERKELEY J. EMPL. &
LAB. L. 1 (1995); Ellen J. Dannin & Clive Gilson, Getting to Impasse: Negotiations Under the
NLRA and the Employment Contracts Act, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 917 (1996).
[Vol. I111
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ton, or a Darwin, or an Einstein comes along, we are amazed-amazed that
someone trained in a certain way of thinking is able to throw off those academic
shackles and think about a problem in a new way. In pursuing law as an aca-
demic subject, comparative study makes this process easier by providing the
perspective we need to observe anomalies and then, ideally, to appreciate the
solution that otherwise eludes us because of our mindset.37
The Sago disaster, in some sense, has already done a great deal to reveal
anomalies in coal mining safety laws and regulations. Notwithstanding several
examples to the contrary,38 members of the legal community and citizens of this
country in general hold fast to the view that our country has moved beyond its
industrial-revolution-era history of workplace abuse. 39 At least with respect to
coal mining, there is much truth in that perspective. Our current track record
easily surpasses the horrors of the pre-1930 period, when on average 2,295 min-
ers were killed each year.40  But, "while 13 West Virginia coal miners were
trapped inside the Sago Mine . . . , three Tasmanian miners were saved from a
fire by an 8-by-5-foot steel box. ' 4 1 And less than a month after twelve of the
thirteen Sago coal miners perished, "72 miners in Saskatchewan were rescued
after being trapped underground for 30 hours, thanks to a similar box called a
mine rescue chamber. ''42 On the other hand, less than six months after the Sago
disaster, and eight days after the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety
and Training imposed a statewide moratorium on the installation of supposedly
"explosion-proof' Omega block seals used at Sago-five more men in Darby,
Kentucky perished in a coal-mine explosion 43 in which Omega block seals also
37 Of course, this comparative study can be done even at a domestic level. Indeed, one of the
strengths of our own legal system is its federal constitutional nature. By allowing the states to
experiment with different solutions to the same legal problems facing all of the states, we all bene-
fit from the collective and different experiences of the whole.
38 Perhaps the best known example is the modem day sweatshop, which remains extant in the
United States. See Sweatshop Watch, http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/index.php?s=67 (last vis-
ited June 4, 2007). In fact, the discovery of slave sweatshops in California in 1995, led to the
Department of Labor's "No Sweat" Campaign, which targeted the predominantly female garment
workers to increase compliance with labor standards in the garment industry (such as minimum
wage, overtime pay, child labor, and safety standards). See No Sweat Initiative,
http://www.dol.gov/esa/forum/fact.htm (last visited June 4, 2007); Honorable Alexis H. Herman,
Remarks at the Marymount University Academic Search for Sweatshop Solutions (May 30, 1997),
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/herman/speeches/sp970603.htm (last visited Sept.
19, 2008).
39 Indeed, most businesses take the position that they view workplace safety as a top priority.
See, e.g., A Majority of U.S. Businesses Report Workplace Safety Delivers a Return on Investment,
BUsINESS WIRE, Aug. 29, 2001, available at LexisNexis.
40 Thomas Frank, supra note 21.
41 Ken Ward, MSHA Ignored Law on Rescue Chambers, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Feb. 5, 2006,
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary-0286-12598920_ITM.
42 Id.
43 See 2006 FATALGRAMS AND FATAL INVESTIGATION REPORTS: COAL MINES, supra note 6.
20081
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failed.44 Despite the eighty-year trend of declining fatalities in United States'
coal mines, the Sago and Darby disasters-two underground mine explosions,
six months apart, in which "explosion-proof' seals failed-raise serious ques-
tions as to the current safety of the mining industry.45
The comparative approach allows us to examine American coal mine
safety on several levels. First, we look in our own backyard: how does the
West Virginia coal mine safety record stand up to mine safety records in other
coal-producing states, especially large coal-producing states like Kentucky and
Pennsylvania that engage in underground mining?46 We might then look else-
where, to other countries engaged in underground coal mining, and assess the
safety of their mines. In both cases, we must ask whether the underlying causes
for fatalities differ. For example, preliminary research suggests that death by
inundation is increasing in India, while underground flood fatalities have never
been a significant problem in the United States.47 Does that mean that the
United States has something to teach India about preventing underground mine
floods, or does it mean only that certain geological circumstances make Indian
mines more susceptible to flooding than American mines?
To ensure a rich conversation that takes into account all interests, the
questions raised by the Law Review editors must be answered by government,
industry, and labor, all of whom have been invited to give their perspectives on
these and other questions relating to coal-mine safety. This diversity of perspec-
tive will ensure a fair discussion of the substantive questions raised in Sago's
aftermath.
B. The Interdisciplinary Approach
Let me now turn to the Law Review's interdisciplinary approach to
coal-mine safety. Early on, the Law Review editors recognized that substantive
questions arose in the context of a regulated industry. In particular, comprehen-
sive federal legislation of coal mine health and safety first appeared in the af-
termath of another West Virginia mine explosion-the enactment of the Federal
44 Ken Ward, MSHA: Industry Debate Extent of New Seal Rules, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb.
23, 2007, http:l/wvgazette.comlNewslBeyond+Sago/20070223001 1.
45 Joel Darmstadter, Productivity Change in U.S. Coal Mining, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, at
22 (July 1997), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-97-40.pdf (noting trend be-
tween 1931 and 1994).
46 "The three largest coal-producing states are Wyoming, West Virginia, and Kentucky.
Texas and Pennsylvania are major producers; eleven other states are significant producers of coal:
Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Montana, North Dakota, New Mexico, Ohio, Utah,
and Virginia." Statistics available at North American Energy Working Group, North America:
The Energy Picture, (June 2002) http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/northamerica/enginfr3.htm.
47 Smith, supra note 34.
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Coal Mine Health and Safety Act in 1969.48 Then after another mine disaster,
Congress passed the more stringent Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
(Mine Act of 1977). 49 It is clear that since the passage of the Mine Act of 1977,
there has been a steady decrease in coal mining fatality rates, at least until
2006.50 However, the extent to which comprehensive coal mine safety regula-
tions have affected this downward trend should be evaluated. 5' In any event,
that regulatory context, coupled with the current Bush Administration's deregu-
latory stance on health and safety,52 forces us to ask two fundamental questions:
What role, if any, should the law play in regulating coal mining safety? If the
law has a role to play, what remedies or sanctions, if any, should the law man-
date?
At first blush, the question whether the law should play a regulatory role
in mine safety might be seen by some as a straightforward legal question. But,
by bringing together economists, legal academics, and policy makers, the Law
Review hopes to spark a richer debate over whether safety regulations in fact
make the workplace safer or whether the free market provides sufficient incen-
tives to encourage mine safety. And so, we have invited free market thinkers
here who advocate the position that the problems inherent in coal mine safety
are best solved first by repealing the Mine Act of 1977 and then by allowing the
free market to drive unsafe mines out of business.53 In their view, in a free mar-
ket, safer mines would attract better workers and would thrive. Those free mar-
ket advocates disagree with those who believe that regulation is justified for
both economic and moral reasons. Those who favor regulation view market
48 See Davitt McAteer, Farmington Victims Left Legacy to Nation's Miners, (Jan. 1999)
http://www.wvgenweb.org/wvcoal/farm.html (last visited June 4, 2007) (explaining that "the
Farmington disaster was a catalyst for passage of the 1969 Coal Mine Safety and Health Act").
49 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. In 1977, Congress also enacted the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.
50 According to the U.S. Department of Labor, "Mining fatalities dropped sharply under the
[MSHA] from 272 in 1977 to eighty-six in 2000." HISTORY OF MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
LEGISLATION, http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/MSHAINF2.HTM (last visited June 4, 2007).
51 Some commentators believe, for example, that the regulations have had little or no benefi-
cial effect. See C. Gregory Ruffennach, Saving Lives or Wasting Resources? The Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act. No. 453 Policy Analysis, CATO INSTrrUTE, Sept. 19, 2002,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa453.pdf (last visited June 4, 2007).
52 According to the AFL-CIO,
Under the Bush administration, regulatory activity at both the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) has ground to a halt. Important standards close to
completion at the end of the Clinton administration-including a standard on
employer payment for personal protective equipment-have been withdrawn
or delayed repeatedly by the Bush administration.
Death on the Job: The Toll of Neglect, at 1 (16th ed. April 2007),
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/safety/memorial/upload/doj_.2007.pdf (last visited June 4, 2007).
53 Ruffennach, supra note 51 (advocating the free market approach of deregulating).
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failures as driven in part by imperfect information or inequality of bargaining
power between the coal miners and their employers. More fundamentally, those
who favor mine safety regulation believe that it is the moral obligation of our
legislature to enact laws to protect workers.
Assuming a regulatory scheme should be in place, one might ask
whether enforcement measures currently in place are sufficient. Are fines ade-
quate or should criminal sanctions including imprisonment be imposed for will-
ful violation of federal or state safety standards? In fact, the Mine Act of 1977
provides for criminal sanctions54 but regulators do not systematically impose
such penalties." And perhaps less obviously, we must ask whether Congress is
properly funding administrative agencies charged with inspecting mines so that
those agencies can realistically achieve their mandate to keep American miners
safe.
56
Assuming there is a role for law-to combat market failure, to fulfill a
perceived human-rights goal of creating some floor of employee safety rights, or
to achieve a combination of those economic and social goals-one must re-
evaluate what we need to regulate and whether some current regulatory ap-
proaches should be discarded for new initiatives.57
To answer these questions, we need to hear from the various constitu-
ents, labor officials and industry representatives, who, because of their experi-
ence working in and operating mines, can identify some of the things that we
need to regulate. We might look to the Sago Preliminary Report for suggestions
as to the appropriate direction to follow. According to that Report, several tech-
nological failures likely led to the Sago disaster. The Omega block seals failed.
Communications systems failed. The miners' breathing equipment failed,
eliminating the possibility of escape and leaving the miners to barricade them-
selves as a last resort. Finally, unlike the mines in Tasmania and Saskatchewan,
the Mine Act of 1977 did not require, and the Sago mine was not equipped with,
an emergency shelter that could have allowed miners to survive underground for
an extended period of time.
While the Report makes several recommendations regarding each of
these failures, the Law Review Symposium seeks the insights of engineers and
other experts who can discuss how to solve these problems. The Law Review
has invited lawmakers to discuss recent unprecedented legislative initiatives and
how advances in technology are being and/or can be distributed to coal miners.
Finally, the Law Review solicits a discussion relating to training miners and
rescuers in the use of new communications and other equipment.58
54 See HISTORICAL DATA ON MINING DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1.
55 Harsh Trivedi & Ilissa Brownstein, Employment-Related Crimes, 39 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 355
(2002).
56 Death on the Job: The Toll of Neglect, supra note 52.
57 See, e.g., David T. Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 294 (2006).
58 This interdisciplinary, problem-solving approach is similar to the approach taken by The
Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, whose mission is "to advance fresh thinking and
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In sum, an interdisciplinary approach is essential to address the follow-
ing questions: What technology is needed? Is the technology available? If not,
can it be developed? If it is developed, why hasn't the technology been distrib-
uted? With that purpose in mind, the Law Review Symposium presents a Post-
Sago Roundtable with industry representatives, labor representatives, engineers,
business experts, legislators, regulators, and many others to brainstorm and re-
solve these questions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Coal mine safety is a significant issue for West Virginia, the nation, and
the global economy. Although coal mining in the United States as a whole is
safer than coal mining in most other countries, West Virginians seem to pay a
higher price than others for the collective good of the global economy. And so,
our Law Review symposium asks these questions with the hope that a compara-
tive and interdisciplinary approach to coal mine safety will precipitate creative
thinking that will help keep our miners safe.
analytically rigorous approaches to environmental decisionmaking - across disciplines, sectors,
and boundaries." Mission statement available at
http://research.yale.edu/envirocenter/index.php?page=mission. (last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
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